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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
MASTER AND SERVANT-DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR WILL
APPLY TO SERVANT USING AN AUt'OMATIC AIR HAAMER.
Fergusion v. Fulton Iron Works, 259 S. W. (Mo.) 811.
Plaintiff, an employee of defendant, was engaged in chipping rough
metal projections from metal castings with an automatic air hammer con-
taining a chisel. While engaged in working with this apparatus, the hammer
vibrated, causing metal castings to fly out, thus injuring the sight of one
of plaintiff's eyes. Plaintiff seeks to recover on the doctrine of res Ipsa
loquitur.
The Court held that this doctrine would apply to this case, as the rule
of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked in master and servant cases when the
instrumentalities are peculiarly within the knowledge of the master, and
when the master is in a much better position to explain the cause of the
accident than the injured party.
MUNICIPAL CORPORAMIONS-LIABILITY TO CITIZENS THROUGH
NEGLIGENCE IN INSTALLATION OF SO-CALLED SAFETY DEVICE.
Mayor and Aldernen of Vicksburg vs. Harralson, 101 So. 713 (Miss. 1924).
Plaintiff seeks recovery for personal injuries received by him on account
of a severe "bumping" inflicted in driving an automobile over a "bumper".
This device was merely a convex portion of the pavement, five inches in
height and five feet wide at its base, and extending across the street on
which plaintiff was driving. Its purpose was to warn drivers of a blind
intersection just on the other side. The bumper complained oi was installed
only a few days before the plaintiff's injuries were sustained, and replaced
a former one known to have been dangerous. The former one was known
to plaintiff, and a sign warning of the traffic at the intersection and of the
bumper located at the side of the street, a reasonable distance preceding
the bumper.
As a result of driving over the bumper the plaintiff was thrown against
the steering wheel of his car in such a way that the impact caused an
Injury to his heart. He was driving at a moderate speed.
Held, an automobile driver Is not required to use extraordinary care
but may assume that the street Is reasonably safe for vehicular traffic, A
city is negligent In placing in its streets a dangerous device or obstruction
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